Some neat new evidence from the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh, where they’ve just carried out a randomised field experiment on teacher merit pay.
Teacher Incentives in Developing Countries: Experimental Evidence from India
Karthik Muralidharan & Venkatesh Sundararaman
Performance pay for teachers is frequently suggested as a way of improving educational outcomes in schools, but the empirical evidence to date on its effectiveness is limited and mixed. We present results from a randomized evaluation of a teacher incentive program implemented across a representative sample of government-run rural primary schools in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh. The program provided bonus payments to teachers based on the average improvement of their students’ test scores in independently administered learning assessments (with a mean bonus of 3% of annual pay). Students in incentive schools performed significantly better than those in control schools by 0.19 and 0.12 standard deviations in math and language tests respectively. They scored significantly higher on “conceptual” as well as “mechanical” components of the tests suggesting that the gains in test scores represented an actual increase in learning outcomes. Incentive schools also performed better on subjects for which there were no incentives. We find no significant difference in the effectiveness of group versus individual teacher incentives. Incentive schools performed significantly better than other randomly-chosen schools that received additional schooling inputs of a similar value.
You can’t get much simpler thanÂ the formula used to determine the merit payment:
Bonus = Rs. 500 * (% Gain in average test scores â€“ 5%) if Gain > 5%
= 0 otherwise